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Note from the Field
Internationalized Pro Bono and a New
Global Role for Lawyers in the 21st Century:
Lessons from Nation-Building in Southern
Sudan
Maya Steinitzt
From 2004 to 2006, the author led the pro bono representation of the
Sudan People's Liberation Movement ("SPLM"), assisting the SPLM in
drafting and negotiating the National Interim Constitution of Sudan, the
Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, and the Constitutions of two
"transitional" states. The representation was part of an emerging trend
in pro bono representations. In small but increasing numbers, private
law firms have begun to take on pro bono projects with global significance
- assisting governments and civil society in post-conflict countries to
deal on an even footing with foreign investors, for instance, or working
with international criminal courts to prepare indictments of war
criminals. This development within the legal community is connected to
changes in the scope and ambition of the "corporate responsibility"
initiatives of many of the multinational corporate clients of firms leading
the internationalization of pro bono services.
The entry of law firms and multinational corporations into the
'market' of global affairs - long the exclusive domain of governments
t Dr. Maya Steinitz is a Senior Associate at Latham & Watkins. This Note was written
while serving as a Visiting Scholar at Columbia Law School. I am indebted to Nathan Miller,
Executive Director of Rule of Law International (RoLl), who designed and managed the
project from Southern Sudan and to James Kearney, Senior Partner and head of the global pro
bono practice at Latham & Watkins who oversaw the representation and without whom this
representation would not have been possible. I am also grateful to Nathan Miller for many of
the descriptions of the reality in Southern Sudan at the time of the peace and constitutional
negotiations included in this Note and for his comments on earlier drafts. I am equally
grateful to the dozens of attorneys at Latham & Watkins who dedicated their time and effort
to the representation of the SPLM. I thank Tzung-Lin Fu, Tom Giblin and Viravyne Chhim for
[INCOM]their research assistance. This paper is based on a lecture given at Duke Law School
and at the New York City Bar's International Law Section. Maya.Steinitz@gmail.com.
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and inter-governmental organizations - offers many advantages to
clients in developing and post-conflict countries, but also poses dangers
which can and should be mitigated. One of the foremost benefits private
law firms offer a unique ability to ensure - even to guarantee - local
ownership of the process and its content, due to the strict requirements of
the attorney-client relationship. These include attorneys' obligations to
follow the directives of their clients, to keep the confidences of the clients,
and to act independently of any third party. Unlike other players in the
field of international aid (such as foreign donor governments, inter-
governmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and private foundations), private lawyers providing pro bono
services do not receive donations, do not have "mandates" other than
those dictated by the client within the bounds of ethical regulations, and
are not accountable to real or imagined "constituencies" other than the
client. Yet the enforceability of the ethical code that gives rise to those
advantages is questionable in a transnational representation. A lack of
regulation raises questions about legitimacy and accountability, and may
suggest the specter of legal imperialism.
A practical approach to mitigating those disadvantages can be gleaned
from the novel work of an increasing number of scholars writing within
the Global Administrative Law (GAL) paradigm. GAL scholars have
analyzed the myriad ways in which disparate national administrative
standards have been synchronized, though not necessarily harmonized, in
various contexts (such as environmental concerns and accounting
standards). A key concept in GAL scholarship is that of transnational
networks - patterns of regular and purposive relations (and institutions)
among like regulatory bodies working across borders and demarcating the
"domestic" from the "international." This Article will draw on this and
other concepts and principles of GAL scholarship in proposing ways to
bring accountability to transnational pro bono activities (indeed to
transnational lawyering in general) that respect the domestically self-
regulated legal profession and which cannot (and should not) be
harmonized across jurisdictions. Rather, the article suggests that
regulation of global pro bono service should graduate from "accidental
distributed administration" to "deliberate transnational network
administration." Without some attention paid to the way law firms
operate in this arena, there is a risk that the ethical obligations of
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INTRODUCTION
Fixing the world's problems has become an increasingly elite affair - a
matter between C.E.O.'s[sic] and celebrities. It's noblesse oblige on a
large scale.'
The most interesting test for humanitarianism comes precisely when we
realize we must remain uncertain about where virtue lies and what costs
we impose - but when we nevertheless step forward to govern .... I
propose that those who share my impulse to make the international world
a more just and humane place join in building a humanitarian practice
which embraces the freedom and responsibility that comes with an
ongoing awareness of the dark sides of humanitarian governance.2
From 2004 through 2006, Latham & Watkins LLP represented, on a pro
bono basis, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) in its post-
peace agreement constitutional process. The aim of this Note, based on the
author's experience leading the representation of SPLM, is threefold: (1) to
contextualize the growing movement of pro bono representations by
"mega law firms" in the field of international rule of law development and
to theorize about this growing phenomenon; (2) to document the author's
observations and insights into the unique characteristics of international
aid in the form of pro bono legal representations, with an emphasis on the
unique benefits of providing international aid through the establishment of
an attorney-client relationship between the "aid donor" and the "aid
recipient; and (3) to provide practical suggestions on how to maximize the
benefits of this trend and how to minimize its downsides.
The Note begins with a brief overview of the Sudanese peace process
as it relates to the provision and scope of pro bono legal representation to
the SPLM, as an illustration of the potential scope and impact of the trends
to be discussed. The Note goes on to discuss the benefits of introducing the
attorney-client relationship into the "toolbox" of international aid
mechanisms,3 applying the emerging scholarship on Global Administrative
Law (GAL) to the phenomenon described. Practical means are suggested
through which thoughtful and self-conscious implementation of the GAL
paradigm can help maximize the benefits and minimize the possible
1. Patricia Cohen, Free-Market Mischief in Hot Spots of Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2007, at
E4 (quoting Naomi Klein, Address Before the American Sociological Association Conference
(Summer 2007).
2. DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDE OF VIRTUE xx (2004).
3. It is not the intention of this Note to advocate the supremacy of this form of
international aid. Rather, the intention is to describe and analyze the nature of this new tool
as one of many mechanisms of international aid.
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downsides of providing international legal aid by way of forging attorney-
client relationships.
1. BACKGROUND
Sudan has been embroiled in the longest-running civil war of the
twentieth century, lasting from 1954 to 2005 with a break from 1972 to
1983.4 On January 9, 2005, the Khartoum-based national Government of
Sudan ("GoS"), dominated by the National Congress Party, and Southern
Sudan, represented by the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM),
signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).5 The core arrangements
of the CPA included a re-structuring of the Sudanese federal system into a
form of "asymmetrical federalism," wherein northern Sudan would have
two levels of government - the national level and the state level.6 By
contrast, Southern Sudan would be governed by three federal levels - the
national level, the state level, and a new, sub-national, quasi-autonomous
Government of Southern Sudan ("GoSS"). 7 Also at the heart of the CPA
were the notions of decentralization and devolution of power from the
political center (the national Government of Sudan in Khartoum) to the
local levels (the GoSS, the states, and local communities), as well as the
sharing of wealth among the Sudanese communities.8 In order to achieve
this new and complex political structure, the Sudanese were required to
4. For a comprehensive history of Sudan's civil war, see DOUGLAS H. JOHNSON, THE ROOT
CAUSES OF SUDAN'S CIVIL WARS (2003) and INT'L CRISIS GROUP, ICGAfrica Report No. 39, GOD,
OIL AND COUNTRY: CHANGING THE LOGIC OF WAR IN SUDAN (2002), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report-archive/A400534_28012002.pdf
(last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
5. The CPA is comprised of a series of six agreements: (1) The Protocol of Machakos (PM)
(signed on July 20, 2002), in which the parties agreed on a broad framework setting forth the
principles of governance, the transitional process, and the structures of government, state and
religion, as well as the right to self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan; (2) The
Protocol on Security Arrangements (signed on Sept. 25, 2003); (3) The Protocol on Wealth-
Sharing (signed on Jan. 7, 2004); (4) The Protocol on Power-Sharing (signed on May 26, 2004);
(5) The Protocol on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and the
Blue Nile States (signed on May 26, 2004); and (6) The Protocol on the Resolution of Conflict
in Abyie (signed on May 26, 2004). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the
Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan
People's Liberation Army, Jan. 9, 2005, available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SlD/ EVIU-6AZBDB?OpenDocument
[hereinafter CPA] (last visited Mar. 2, 2009); see also U.S. Institute of Peace, Comprehensive
Peace Agreement, available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sudan/
cpa01092005/cpajtoc.html (last visited July 30, 2008) (containing ancillary updates and
amendments); INT'L CRISIS GROUP, AFRICA REPORT No. 106, SUDAN'S COMPREHENSIVE PEACE
AGREEMENT: THE LONG ROAD AHEAD (2006) (containing an in-depth analysis of the CPA),
available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn-of-africa/106-
sudan comprehensive-peaceagreementlongroad-ahead.pdf (last visited July 30, 2008).
6. The Protocol on Power-sharing, in CPA, supra note 5, at sec. 1.3.
7. Since Southern Sudan is a sub-national entity, whereas northern Sudan is a political
designation, this Note capitalizes the term "Southern Sudan" but not the term "northern
Sudan."
8. The Implementation Modalities of the Framework Agreement on Wealth Sharing (Jan.
7, 2004), in CPA, supra note 5, at sec. 1.
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rewrite the constitutions of Sudan. Specifically, the CPA called for the re-
writing of the national constitution, a brand new constitution for the new
GoSS, and new state constitutions. 9
The resources available to the Southern Sudanese in order to meet
these daunting tasks, after more than twenty years of civil war, were
almost nil. When the CPA was signed, the entirety of Southern Sudan's
legal community consisted of approximately 100 lawyers, including the de
facto Minister of Justice, the future or de facto Supreme Court judges, civil
society lawyers, and the "private sector" lawyers.10 The Secretariat of
Legal Affairs and Constitutional Development ("SoLA"), the proto-
Ministry of Justice - the body charged with protecting the legal interests
of Southern Sudan and managing the legal aspects of the transition to the
GoSS - had six lawyers, none of whom were paid. SoLA had no material
resources of any kind, neither office nor vehicle, and functioned without
any support staff." Despite the immense research and drafting demands
placed on them, no SoLA staff had computers or access to either the
Internet or print references. Southern Sudan had forty-two laws, most of
which were never distributed to judges or lawyers.1 2
Hearings were conducted in buildings that were structurally
incomplete. Courts were not equipped with water, electricity, or the basic
office supplies that make the recording and dissemination of judgments
possible. In fact, a total of twenty-six trial courts and eight appeals courts,
along with a handful of support staff, served the entire Southern Sudanese
population of approximately eight million people.' 3
In short, Southern Sudan had no modern rule of law structures 14 and
no other infrastructure to speak of. Conversely, the territory of the North
remained free of conflict, leaving the GoS free to collect taxes, develop
infrastructure, and exploit some oil reserves. GoS maintained relations
with the world at large and was able to retain the services of high-end
9. See The Protocol of Machakos (establishing self-determination for the people of
Southern Sudan and right to succeed through a referendum); PM Preamble and Part B Sec.
2.1(f) (mandating the establishment of the Constitutional Framework for the Peace Agreement
and the institutions enumerated therein); PM Part C Sec. 3.1.1 (declaring "[tihe National
Constitution of Sudan is the Supreme Law of the land."); The Protocol on Power Sharing
("PPS") Part I, Sec. 1.5.1.1 (establishing decentralization and devolution of powers); PPS Part
I, Sec. 1.5.1.2 (declaring that the Interim National Constitution "[sihall be the Supreme Law of
the land and the Southern Sudan Constitution," and state constitutions must comply with it);
PPS Part I, Sec. 1.5.1.3, Sec. 3 (establishing the GoSS); PPS Sec. 4 (establishing the institutions
of the State level); PPS Schedules A: National Powers, PPS Schedule B: Powers of the
Government of Southern Sudan, PPS Schedule C: Powers of the States (establishing a-
symmetrical federalism), in CPA, supra note 5.
10. Nathan Miller, Focal Point Team on Justice, Police, and Prisons, Framework for the
Building and Establishment of the Rule of Law in New Sudan 14 (Sept. 12, 2003) [hereinafter
Framework for Building the Rule of Law] (unpublished manuscript on file with author);
Interview with Nathan Miller, Executive Director of Rule of Law International (RoLl) in New
York, NY (Febuary 1, 2008) [hereinafter Miller Interview].
11. Framework for Building the Rule of Law, supra note 10, at 21.
12. Id. at 15.
13. Id. at 6.
14. Southern Sudan has, of course, robust traditional tribal law.
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private sector lawyers to advise it on the negotiations of the CPA. As a
result, like the peace negotiations, the constitutional negotiations were
marred by a severe inequality of arms between the Southern Sudanese and
the GoS.
Sudan has been at war for thirty-eight of the last fifty years. The most
recent round of conflict - a civil war between the GoS and the SPLM that
lasted twenty-two years, cost two million lives, and displaced four million
people - devastated Southern Sudan.15 Furthermore, the civil war itself
was a continuation of a pattern of political and military oppression,
unequal distribution of resources, and uneven development that stretches
back decades, if not centuries. The combination of historical inequality
with twenty years of violence and military rule has left Southern Sudan
with a total lack of physical and communications infrastructure, a drastic
shortage of human resources, and nearly nonexistent civilian legal and
political institutions.16
The signing of the CPA brought with it the possibility for a just and
sustainable peace, reconstruction, and development for the impoverished
South, but it also placed exceptionally high demands on the handful of
legal professionals from the SPLM. The agreed-upon political structure of
Sudan includes an Interim National Government (ING), a semi-
autonomous sub-national GoSS, and twenty-five states. Each of these
levels of government is to have its own constitution and laws. 17 In
addition, the CPA mandates a number of key national institutions such as
the National Petroleum Commission, a National Human Rights
Commission, and a National Land Commission.18 In order to consolidate
the peace and avoid future conflict, the interests of both parties would have
had to be fully represented in the negotiation of all constitutional,
legislative, and regulatory frameworks.
Since the completion of the constitutions, the implementation of the
CPA, and with it the stability of the fledgling peace agreement, is coming
undone. The collapse is most visible in Abyei, where President Bashir
endorsed Arab militias who carry out Darfur-style scorched-earth tactics,
including burning Abyei to the ground in May 2008, as part of an ongoing
dispute between the North and the South on the implementation of the
Abyei Protocol.' 9 Often considered the most pressing humanitarian crisis
on the planet, the northwestern state of Darfur continues to be ravaged by
the violence of militias armed and supported by the Khartoum
government. 20 The International Crisis Group warns of a military build-
up of Darfur rebels followed by northern soldiers in the sensitive, oil-rich
15. Framework for Building the Rule of Law, supra note 10, at 3.
16. Id. at 3, 16; Miller Interview, supra note 10.
17. The Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 5, sec. 2.14, 3.2, 4.3.
18. The Protocol on Power Sharing, supra note 5, sec. 2.10.1.2; The Protocol on Wealth
Sharing, supra note 5, sec. 2.6, 3.2.
19. Eliza Griswold, The Man for New Sudan, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 14, 2008, at 54.
20. Lydia Polgreen, Peacekeeping in Darfur Hits More Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2008, at
[Vol. 12
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transitional state of Southern Kordofan, which straddles Northern and
Southern Sudan.21 "All of Sudan's wars involve the handiwork of a small
group in the center waging campaigns against those who live at the
periphery. To hold onto power and resources, the center fights its own
edge."22
While the Bush administration has kept Khartoum under sanctions,
acquiesced in the Security Council's referral of Darfur prosecutions to the
International Criminal Court, and led several large-scale diplomatic
initiatives to push for peace in the region, "pressure for comprehensive
peace in Sudan is flagging, in part because America's wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan have hamstrung its ability to call Khartoum on its myriad
abuses against its own people. "23
I1. INTERNATIONALIZED PRO BONO IN CONTEXT
Given the severe lack of resources described above, Latham & Watkins
offered to assist the Southern Sudanese in the Constitutional Process. 24 At
the time of this writing, this remains the only instance in which a law firm
has undertaken the pro bono representation of an emerging government in
a constitutional process. 25 But this innovative form of legal aid must be
viewed as part of a larger trend: international "mega law firms," as well as
other sections of the Anglo-American private law sector, are increasingly
undertaking ambitious and cutting-edge pro bono legal representations in
post-conflict situations, emerging democracies, and emerging markets.
Another vanguard of the trend, for example, is DLA Piper's "New
Perimeter" initiative - a nonprofit subsidiary established by the
21. Posting of Ingrid Jones to Sudan Watch,, http://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2008/12/
sudans-south-kordofan-next-darfur.html (Dec. 7, 2008) (reporting on the mounting crisis in
Southern Kordofan).
22. Griswold, supra note 19.
23. Id. at 55.
24. Latham & Watkins was not alone in providing assistance in the constitutional process.
The Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law ("MPI"), funded
by the European Union (EU), which had been involved since it helped broaden the Machaos
Protocol in 2002, provided both North and Southern Sudan with constitutional lawyers. The
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, with funding from USACO, also
worked with the Southern Sudanese.
25. This is as opposed to other forms of international assistance or intervention. See KIRsTI
SAMUELS, INT'L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, CONSTITUTION BUILDING
PROCESSES AND DEMOCRATIZATION, http://www.idea.int/conflict/cbp/upload/IDEA%20CB
P%20Comparative%20paper%20by%2OKirsti%2OSamuels.pdf (last visited July 30, 2008)
(studying twelve cases of recent constitution building undertaken during transition from
conflict or authoritarian rule). See also NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR AND THE
ETHICS OF NATION BUILDING (2004) (containing an account of the author's involvement in the
drafting of the US occupation-led Transitional Authority Law in Iraq). It has even been
argued that in post-conflict constitutional processes there exists "a double compact: 'A
compact between rulers and their people and a compact between the government and the
international community."' Kirsti Samuels, Paradoxes and Compromises in the Design of
Post-Conflict Constitutions *18 (unpublished manuscript) (on file at http://state-
building.org).
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international firm and dedicated exclusively to long-term international pro
bono work. An example of the work carried out by the subsidiary includes
"work[ing] closely with a Kosovar advisory group to successfully structure
and draft new laws to introduce an independent judiciary and system of
prosecution in Kosovo... [and working with] the interim government to
approve the legislation they helped draft and provide technical assistance
directly to the new Ministry of Justice regarding the implementation of
these laws." 26 The law firm of Paul Hastings reports supporting legal
reform in Cambodia by working "with the Bar Association of the Kingdom
of Cambodia (BAKC) in an effort to improve and reform Cambodia's
existing legal system ... including the set up of a BAKC lawyers' training
center and a local legal clinic, in developing a continuing legal education
program and in addressing gender equality laws." 27 In addition, White &
Case attorneys volunteered to review pending legislation in the area of
elder law in South Africa, 28 and Sherman & Sterling regularly sends
associates to support the prosecutor at the U.N. International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda. 29
In fact, pro bono rule of law development initiatives around the world
have become so prevalent that the American Bar Association recently
consolidated its rule of law pro bono initiatives, many of which are carried
out in cooperation with practitioners and law firms, under the ABA Rule of
Law Initiative.30 Some new non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such
as the International Senior Lawyers Project 3' and Lawyers Without
Borders, 32 have been established with the model of matching lawyers who
26. DLA Piper, DLA Piper's International Pro Bono Initiative Completes Projects and
Establishes New Priorities in its Second Year (May 22, 2006), available at
http://www.dlapiper.com/new-perimeter-2nd-year-release/. An interview about New
Perimeters named many reasons why law firms engage in broad, international pro bono
initiatives, such as helping to "differentiate the firm from competitors and to attract new
clients," branding the firm on the global stage, and retaining young lawyers through
"promoting internal camaraderie." Thomas Adcock, Firm Launches Major Pro Bono Effort, N.Y.
L.J., Mar. 11, 2005, at 16. One could argue that such reasons are not altruistic reasons to
undertake philanthropic projects. That, however, is arguably the case with philanthropy in
general.
27. Paul Hastings, Tokyo Office Opens Doors to Humanitarian Efforts and Legal Reform
in Cambodia, http://www.paulhastings.com/community-involvement-detail.aspx?Officeld
=7837 (last visited July 30, 2008).
28. Mary P. Gallagher, Taking Pro Bono to Jo'burg, N.J. L.J., Apr. 29, 2004,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1082923359383 (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
29. Susan Littwin, Rushing to Help When Bad News Breaks, CORP. BOARD MEMBER,
July/Aug. 2006, at 112.
30. The Initiative's website provides a good view of the breadth and nature of projects
undertaken by the ABA, law firms and individual lawyers. See ABA Rule of Law Initiative,
http://www.abanet.org/rol/programs/; then follow "Access to Justice and Human Rights,"
"Anti-Corruption and Public Integrity," "Criminal Law Reform and Anti-Human
Trafficking," "Judicial Reform," "Legal Education Reform and Civic Education," "Legal
Profession Reform and Women's Rights" hyperlinks (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
31. See International Senior Lawyers Project, http://www.islp.org/aboutus; then follow
"Human Rights and Social Welfare," "Equitable Economic Development" and "Access to
Justice" hyperlinks (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
32. See Lawyers Without Borders, http://www.lwob.org/; then follow "Our Projects"
hyperlink (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
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wish to provide international pro bono services with opportunities for
assistance in post-conflict and developing countries. To the best of the
writer's knowledge, however, none of the above initiatives have been
structured as an attorney-client relationship, which would impose
unambiguous duties and obligations on attorneys. 33 This is a critical point
that will be revisited in the following section.
First, however, more background would be informative. The trend of
international mega law firms undertaking pro bono representations
concerning rule of law development should be understood as part of an
even larger phenomenon - that of the growing and changing nature of the
"corporate responsibility" movement. 34 Multinational corporations are the
clients of mega law firms. Attorneys in mega law firms discuss (and
sometimes cooperate with) corporate general counsels regarding their
corporate responsibility programs, thus creating a certain self-reinforcing
culture of corporate transnational community involvement.35 Corporations
33. Based both on research and on numerous conversations with pro bono counsels at
various law firms.
34. The leading "corporate citizenship initiative" is the Global Compact under the aegis of
the United Nations. Instructively, its homepage states that "[t]he Global Compact is a
network" and that "[tlhe Global Compact is not a regulatory instrument - it does not 'police,'
enforce or measure the behavior or actions of companies. Rather, the Global Compact relies
on public accountability, transparency and the enlightened self-interest of companies, labour
and civil society to initiate and share substantive action in pursuing the principles upon which
the Global Compact is based." United Nations Global Compact, What is the Global Compact,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (emphasis added) (last visited
July 30, 2008). Definitions of corporate social responsibility (CSR)) vary:
CSR means different things to different groups.... For some, CSR consists
of voluntary activity or the implementation of international codes of
conduct, while others see a role for regulations and hard law in the CSR
landscape. CSR can demand direct engagement with local communities
or simply require adoption of a particular philosophical approach to
doing business. CSR can represent a free-market-friendly alternative to
government regulation, or it can posit an obligation on the part of
companies to assume responsibility for the consequences of their actions.
Environmental and human rights protections tend to feature heavily in
CSR agendas. Other common projects include the construction of health
and education facilities, water treatment programs, and infrastructure
projects such as roads and bridges.
Matthew Genasci & Sarah Pray, Extracting Accountability: The Implications of the Resource Curse
for CSR Theory and Practice, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. DEv. L.J. 37, 40 (2008) (discussing current trends
in CSR, including a move away from headquarters-based programs towards engagement at
the community level).
35. This is based on personal observation as there is no literature to date on the
cooperation between law firms and their corporate clients. An aspirational discussion of this
relationship can be found in a report published by the Swedish Partnership for Global
Responsibility and the International Institute for Environment and Development. HALINA
WARD, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS OF LAW, Sept. 2005, available at
http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/G0195.pdf. Ward provides examples of law firms that
position themselves directly in relation to corporate responsibility. Id. at 29. Ward also states:
With a rise of 'voluntary' corporate responsibility tools such as corporate
codes of conduct or 'soft' law norms such as the UN Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, the norms that business
lawyers draw on in giving their advice are shifting. There is increasingly
9
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have recently taken on increasingly ambitious projects in areas previously
considered the exclusive domain of the public sector, laying the
groundwork for other private sector players (such as the international
mega law firms) to enter the international and transnational public spheres
and the domestic public sphere of post-conflict societies and developing
countries. 36 Both of these converging trends reflect not only the general
trend towards globalization but also the specific erosion of any distinction
between the private and the public spheres in international affairs.37
Whatever one thinks about the desirability of these trends, they are
here to stay and are, in fact, likely to expand given the current socio-
economic characteristics of globalization. 38 Therefore, like so many other
new phenomena in global affairs, the trend of mega firms'
internationalized pro bono runs up against the problem of the global
governance gap.39 From this vantage point, Part 111.1 of this Note describes
an ethical case for business lawyers to maximize their contribution to
corporate social responsibility beyond the 'business case' for action. There
has been very little reflection on the nexus between corporate
responsibility and the wider public functions of the legal profession. Yet
that is precisely what may now be needed.
Id. at vi.
36. See Alyson Warhurst, Future Roles of Business in Society: The Expanding Boundaries of
Corporate Responsibiliti and a Compelling Case for Partnership, 37 FUTURES 151 (2005) (examining
recent trends in global corporate responsibility and the rise in expectations that global
businesses will work with others to provide solutions to humanitarian crises).
37. See, generally, VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR: INDUSTRY
SELF-REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2001) (providing an overview and analysis of the
recent changes in the private sector's role in international affairs, with an emphasis on the self-
regulatory aspect of this phenomenon); see also Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the
Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 L. & SOCY
REV. 635 (2004) (providing a critical view of the self-regulatory nature of corporate social
responsibility). Shamir's article contrasts the voluntary, self-regulatory agenda of
corporations with a notion of global corporate liability, as it relates to state sovereignty:
As corporations emerge as global private authorities approximating the
powers of national governments, we are back to the independent realm of
economic action 'as a major locus of political power.' [Multinational
corporations] are in a position to effectively escape local jurisdiction by
playing one legal system against the other, by taking advantage of local
legal systems ill adapted for effective corporate regulation .... At stake,
therefore, is the widening gap between the transnational regulatory
regimes that may be invoked to monitor and restrain corporations
irrespective of the territory in which they happen to operate.
Id. at 637 (citation omitted).
38. Indeed, Harold Hongju Koh (a transnational legal scholar whose work is further
discussed below) describes "the rise of transnational human networks of both public and
private actors" who work together to promote democracy and human rights standards as the
"third globalization." Harold Hongju Koh, Introduction to 1999 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/1999_hrp-report/overview.html (last
visited Mar. 2, 2009). Koh explains that "corporations, banks, international financial
institutions and private investors ... serve as the transmission belts for human rights norms
and advocates for human rights improvements," especially in transitional societies. Id.
Absent from Koh's list are international "mega law firms," whose involvement in
transnational human rights networks is a relatively recent addition, albeit an important one.
39. See infra Part IV.
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the characteristics of internationalized pro bono that make private law
firms - potentially, at least - immune to many of the traditional
shortcomings of other international development actors. Part 11.2 of the
Note examines obstacles to realizing the full potential of internationalized
pro bono services. Part IV of the Note suggests ways to overcome those
obstacles by offering a framework for regulation on the global plane.
III. THE BENEFITS OF AND IMPEDIMENTS TO THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP IN INTERNATIONALIZED PRO BONO
A. Benefits: Duty of Loyalty and "Local Ownership"
What starkly distinguishes the legal representation of a stakeholder in
the developing world from any other form of international aid is that legal
representation is, first and foremost, a relationship - the attorney-client
relationship. Because this relationship is both regulated and heavily
socially-constructed, it has distinct characteristics with surprising
consequences in the context of international development, particularly in
the representation of sovereigns.
At the heart of the attorney-client relationship is the premise that the
client is the 'owner' of his or her cause and the lawyer is partisan: "The
lawyer is conventionally seen as a professional devoted to his client's
interests and as authorized, if not in fact required, to do some things
(though not anything) for that client which he would not do for himself." 40
This axiom creates the greatest advantage for representing pro bono clients
in the developing world: the retention of local ownership over the cause and the
process.
In contrast, "local ownership" is one of the basic but elusive goals of
international development and human rights intervention by NGOs and
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs): "An absence of local ownership
as the predominant characteristic of any such strategy tends to indicate a
40. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation,
85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 (1976). See also Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice,
37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 623 (1985) (noting critically that "[w]hen pressed for moral justifications
of its amoral stance, the bar often invokes client sovereignty as an ultimate recourse")
(emphasis added). Fried too focuses on the attorney-client relationship as a emphasis on
relationship, as a certain type of association (although not a certain type of authority relationship
as I suggest here) but as a certain type of friendship: the lawyer as a "special-purpose legal
friend." He argues, from the morality of role, that
it is not only legally but also morally right that a lawyer adopt as his
dominant purpose the furthering of his client's interests .. .in [certain]
relations - friendship, kinship - we recognize an authorization to take
the interests of particular concrete persons more seriously and to give
them priority over the interests of the wider collectivity. One who
provides an expensive education for his own children surely cannot be
blamed because he does not use these resources to alleviate famine or to
save lives in some distant land.
Id. at 1976.
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colonial attitude in the intentions of the international community."4 The
World Bank, for example, has summarized its consensus on ownership
issues as follows:
Typically, assistance programmes that the recipient country
perceives as being imposed end in failure or have only a small
development impact. Governments and beneficiaries do not feel
they have a stake when they have not contributed to the
development of a programme. Furthermore, "home grown"
programmes may be more effective in incorporating institutional
capacity, reflecting the needs of different domestic constituencies
and addressing constraints. 42
Instead of characterizing it as a goal, local ownership can more
precisely be described as the El Dorado, the unattainable golden standard
of international aid.
Humanitarianism begins as an impulse - and becomes known as
a practice .... I know this humanitarianism well enough to have
felt the pleasures of engagement and the disappointments of a faith
betrayed. . . . It can be unsettling to think of humanitarians,
whether activists or policy makers, as participants in the world of
41. CAROLYN MCCOOL, INT'L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, THE ROLE
OF CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: CASE STUDY AFGHANISTAN, at
23 (2004), available at http://www.idea.int/conflict/cbp/upload/AFGfinalpaper.pdf. McCool
observes that
It]he international community has been key at every stage of the [2004
Afghani constitutional] process. The relationship of international
initiatives to national peace-, nation- and institution-building processes is
always extremely complicated. The mere presence of foreigners can help
to create a space and the opportunities for opposing elements to learn to
work together. At best these collective efforts are characterised by what is
known as 'local ownership' or 'national ownership', in which the
international community 'leads from behind' and supports the emergence
of local or national leadership at all levels and in all sectors .... This
quality of local ownership is critical to the integrity and to the
sustainability of any peace- or nation-building strategy.
Id. at 23.
42. Gerry Helleiner, External Conditionality, Local Ownership and Development, in
TRANSFORMING DEVELOPMENT: FOREIGN AID FOR A CHANGING WORLD 82, 85 (Jim Freedman
ed., 2000) (discussing the critical literature which makes clear that the failure to achieve local
ownership is inherent to the donor-donee relationship); see also David Mosse, Global
Governance and the Ethnography of International Aid, in THE AID EFFECT 10 (David Mosse &
David Lewis eds., 2005) (viewing the rhetoric of ownership as disguise of more, not less,
intrusion of donors noting that "[slome anthropologists emphasise the way policy rhetoric on
'ownership' or 'partnership' conceal the actual working of aid, 'dispossessing' its agents of
their own rationales and true instrumentalities"); Alan Fowler, Beyond Partnership: Getting Real
about NGO Relationships in the Aid System, in THE EARTHSCAN READER ON NGO MANAGEMENT
241 (Michael Edwards & Alan Fowler eds., 2002) (arguing critically that the promotion of
"partnership" is the currently politically-correct mode of interacting in the context of
international aid and analyzing the sources and the winners and losers of this state of affairs).
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power and influence .... Once we see international humanitarians
as participants in global governance - as rulers - it seems
irresponsible not to be as attentive as possible to the costs, as well
as the benefits, of our work. 43
What does "local ownership" entail? First and foremost, as a matter of
legal ethics, attorneys who are representing pro bono clients (as opposed to,
for example, lawyers who are providing legal assistance or advocacy) must
solicit client input and must defer to client decision-making and direction."
Second, and as a matter of deep socialization, attorneys are trained to
refrain from passing judgment on their clients; indeed, the commercial
viability of their practice depends to a large extent on such restraint.45 It
matters not whether an attorney agrees or disagrees with the position of
the client: as long as it is not unethical or illegal, he or she will advocate
that position. This is a vantage point from which no international aid or
human rights player operates. Rather, international NGOs and aid
agencies tend to perceive themselves as being accountable to multiple
"constituencies," such as the "international community," 46 or to a home-
43. See KENNEDY, supra note 2, at xiv-xv, xvii-xviii.
44. See infra Part 111.1.
45. Coming from a background of human rights activism, the private sector attorneys'
deep sense of non-judgmentalism and refusal to work without clear direction from and
approval of the client was, for me, the most striking feature of the representation of SPLM and
provided the initial impetus for this Note.
Writing critically of the socialization of lawyers, Rhode notes of the ABA's code of conduct:
"Where a threat of formal sanctions is remote, as is generally the case in professional contexts,
the most significant function of official codes will be symbolic and pedagogic." Rhode, supra
note 40, at 647. According to another critic, it is particularly the Anglo-American mega law
firms (who, I argue, are pushing the trend of internationalized pro bono) that place the client's
interest above all other considerations: "[Clompetition puts loyalty to clients at a premium. It
would be professional suicide for a global firm lawyer to exercise independent professional
judgment at the expense of the client's perceived best interests." Christopher J. Whelan, Ethics
Beyond the Horizon: Why Regulate the Global Practice of Law?, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 931, 945
(2001). This critic notes, however, that "Itihe CCBE [i.e., European] Code... has reinforced the
duty of loyalty. It added the words 'and fearlessly' to its original formula: A lawyer must
'defend clients [sic] interests honorably and fearlessly without regard to his own interests or to
any consequences to himself or to any other person." Id. (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
46. Consider, for example, the mission statements of two of the world's leading
international NGOs, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch:
Amnesty International is a worldwide movement of people who
campaign for internationally recognized human rights for all. Our
supporters are outraged by human rights abuses but inspired by hope for
a better world - so we work to improve human rights through
campaigning and international solidarity. We have more than 2.2 million
members and subscribers in more than 150 countries and regions and we
coordinate this support to act for justice on a wide range of issues.
Amnesty International, Who We Are, http://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are (last visited
Mar. 2, 2009); and:
Human Rights Watch is one of the world's leading independent
organizations dedicated to defending and protecting human rights. By
focusing international attention where human rights are violated, we give
voice to the oppressed and hold oppressors accountable for their crimes.
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base (such as the United States Agency for International Development,
which operates on behalf of and for the benefit of the American public, 47
and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development,
which acts on behalf of the British public). 48
Unlike such players, practitioners in private practice do not have
"constituencies," real or imagined, nor do they attempt to fulfill
"mandates," whether actually conferred (as is the case with some IGOs) or
self-imposed (as is the case with many NGOs).49 Rather, as stated before,
private practitioners' only "constituents" are clients and their only
"mandates" are clients' directives. In other words, NGOs have causes,
attorneys have clients.50
A closely related point is that of funding. NGOs and IGOs are funded
by - and therefore accountable to - various donors. 51 By contrast, pro
bono representations operate on a model in which service providers (the
attorneys and the law firms) receive no outside funding and are therefore
accountable to no third party.5 2 This independence allows the preservation
Our rigorous, objective investigations and strategic, targeted advocacy
build intense pressure for action and raise the cost of human rights abuse.
Human Rights Watch, About Us, http://www.hrw.org/en/about (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
47. United States Agency for International Development (USAID), About USAID,
http://www.usaid.gov/about-usaid/ (last visited July 30, 2008) (stating that "U.S. foreign
assistance has always had the twofold purpose offurthering America's foreign policy interests in
expanding democracy and free markets while improving the lives of the citizens of the
developing world") (emphasis added).
48. Department for International Development (DFID), About DFID,
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/ (last visited July 30, 2008) (noting that "[i]n a world of
growing wealth, such levels of human suffering and wasted potential are not only morally
wrong, they are also against our own interests. We are becoming much closer to people in
faraway countries. We trade more and more with people around the world.") (emphasis
added).
49. See supra notes 46-48.
50. This is known in the literature of professional responsibility as the attorney's duty of
loyalty. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (2008) ("Loyalty and
independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client."); Id. at
1.8 cmt. 5 ("Use of information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the client
violates the lawyer's duty of loyalty.").
51. My observation over years of working in international human rights and development
has been that there are a small number of repeat players who fund a very large portion of the
international human rights and development operations. These can be generally grouped into
two categories. One is comprised of North American and European governments (largely the
UK and the Scandinavian governments) and the other is made up of Western-based private
foundations such as George Soros' Open Society Institute and the Ford Foundation. There are
also, of course, corporate monetary and in-kind donations to NGOs, which blur the distinction
between private interest and public interest. See also Shamir, supra note 37, at 647:
"Some such organizations are subtly created by, sponsored, or backed by
corporations. These market-based NGOs are actively distributing
corporate versions concerning the adequate scope and meaning of
[Corporate Social Responsibility] . . . . The single most distinctive
common denominator of these corporate-oriented and corporate-inspired
notions of social responsibility is the voluntary, nonenforceable, and self-
regulatory meaning of the term."
52. Three entities assisted the SPLM in the per se legal aspects of the constitutional process:
MPI, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), and Latham & Watkins
LLP. These three entities were funded by and are accountable to, respectively, the European
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of the confidentiality of the attorney-client communications which, in turn,
fosters more open communication between the stakeholder and the aid
provider. Therefore, this enables the provision of assistance in areas which
simply cannot be broached by other aid providers, who are (self) bound by
a commitment to transparency and by accountability to other
"constituencies" and/or to donors.5 3
A closely related observation pertains to the advocacy function of the
attorney-client relationship. Attorneys are trained and obligated to
advocate unequivocally on behalf of one side of a dispute - the client's -
and are at ease when and if it is necessary to conceptualize a situation in
adversarial terms.54 For example, in the context of the representation of
SPLM, the attorneys representing the GoSS had no hesitations about
adopting the position that they were advocating for the Southern Sudanese
and only for the Southern Sudanese. Rather than following a 'mandate' to
try and reach a compromised conciliation, they advocated for one position
unequivocally. This notion of partisan intervention is almost anathema to
public sector players, such as the MPI, which received funding from the EU
in the context of the CPA and the consequent constitutional negotiations,
and was therefore prohibited by EU policy from offering assistance to the
South that it did not also offer to the North. Most of the international aid
scholarship disapproves of the idea of "taking sides." The fashionable
commitment to relativistic approaches means that the traditional aid
paradigm falls short in situations in which partisan advocacy and
assistance are called for because of moral asymmetry (a clearly aggrieved
party and a clear violator) or severe inequality-of-arms. The attorney-client
relationship provides a much-needed solution to this gap. Indeed, at the
close of the representation of SPLM, one member of the peace and
constitutional negotiation team noted, half-jokingly, that "in some cases we
found that [Latham & Watkins] was becoming more Southern Sudanese
Union, the United States government, and no one.
As a general matter, nonprofits engaged in international development receive donations and
are accountable, on numerous levels, to their donors. They have to meet performance
benchmarks and adhere to donors' mandates, principles and ideologies. They also have
reporting obligations, and their work is periodically reviewed and can be discontinued for
failure to follow the policies, guidelines, agendas or personal and institutional politics of their
donors. In contrast, the representation of SPLM was governed by only one document - the
engagement letter between Latham & Watkins and its client. Like all engagement letters
(contracts which rules of professional responsibility require to be signed between attorneys
and their clients) this engagement letter placed obligations on the service provider to its client
(and, unlike in commercial relationships, did not include a corresponding obligation by the
client to pay for the services). Law firms are partnerships and the partnerships' activities,
including pro bono programs, are funded by the partnerships themselves, which, in turn, are
capitalized through the individual partners' capital contributions.
53. For example, consider Senator Coleman's demand for transparency in connection with
his attempt to persuade the U.S. to cut off funding for the U.N. Human Rights Council due to
the latter's focus on Israel. See infra, note 59.
54. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2008), Preamble: A Lawyer's
Responsibilities, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/modelrules.html ("As an
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary
system.").
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than us," referring to the firm's commitment to the zealous advocacy of
Southern interests. 55
Similarly, not having "constituencies" and "mandates" and being free
from the need to raise funds56 means practitioners have more freedom to
take on unconventional positions within a given context and, more
broadly, to take on causes that are unpopular, not trendy, or that do not
comport with the interest or ideology of the small, well-established
network of funders of the international public sector described below. 57 An
example is the very offer of assistance to the Southern Sudanese at a time
when the Sudan-related international focus is almost exclusively on the
devastation in Darfur.5 8
The attorney-client relationship also inherently provides a new model
for authority relationships in the world of aid providers and aid recipients.
In this new relationship, the aid recipients, now conceived of as clients, are
in a position of authority. Whatever the good (or bad) intentions of
individual international aid workers, a structural imbalance of authority
between local/international actors exists, and the imbalance naturally
favors those holding the purse strings. Much posturing may be done by
both sides, but ultimately the local aid recipient has but two choices: accept
assistance on terms agreeable to the donor or refuse both assistance and
terms. There is little possibility, outside the attorney-client relationship, for
an outcome where the donor strongly disagrees with local priorities but -
respecting the role of a sovereign to organize its own affairs - nonetheless
provides the requested aid.59  These interactions, and the authority
55. Videotaped interview with a member of the peace and constitutional negotiation team
(Aug. 2005) (on file with author).
56. See supra note 52.
57. See supra note 45. Southern Sudan is one such example. While the Southern Sudanese
suffered approximately two million deaths during the decades-long civil war, including a
genocide in the Nuba region in the early 1990s, their cause did not, at the time of Latham &
Watkins' representation of SPLM, have any "celebrity" as compared with the full attention of
the international community to the current devastating humanitarian crisis in the Darfur
region of Sudan. See ALEX DE WAAL, AVERTING GENOCIDE IN THE NUBA MOUNTAINS, SUDAN,
DEC. 22, 2006, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL (SSRC) (Dec. 26, 2006), available at
http://howgenocidesend.ssrc.org/de-Waal2 (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
58. 1 leave it for another time to ponder why some humanitarian crises (e.g., Darfur)
received tremendous public attention while others (such as the genocide in the Nuba region of
Sudan in 1995, the civil war between Southern and North Sudan, or the ongoing war in the
Congo which has so far cost an estimated three million lives) do not.
59. As an example of the strings that are often attached to funding consider the following
report:
Sen. Norm Coleman is pushing for the United States to cut off funding for the
U.N. Human Rights Council, saying the watchdog group's focus on Israel and
failure to investigate other countries made it a "disaster. A Senate Foreign
Relations Committee panel will take up the Human Rights Council's
performance at a hearing Thursday. The committee last month approved
legislation Coleman proposed to end U.S. funding of the council. The House last
month approved similar legislation by Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, R-Fla .... Last
month, the [Council] angered the United States by continuing its scrutiny of
Israel while halting investigations into Cuba and Belarus....
Coleman was further quoted as stating that "[tihis is a statement about the concerns we have
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relations they give rise to, are very different than the kind of relationships
that the "local owners" of the cause usually have with any other
international player. 60
Last but not least, a foundational benefit of operating under the
attorney-client model is that the work of attorneys is regulated. Attorneys
are accountable to their local bar associations and operate under strict
ethical rules and constraints. 61  This starkly contrasts with other
international players who strive for accountability, but do not have the
formal mechanisms to secure it.62 The term "foundational" is used
deliberately because the regulation and accountability of attorneys
underpins all the other benefits enumerated above. I shall return to this
point shortly, but it is worth noting in brief some additional benefits to the
attorney-client relationship model beyond those that relate to local
ownership.
One benefit already alluded to is material resources. Mega law firms
have exceptional resources, such as state-of-the-art technology, which often
cannot be matched by public sector players who are not endowed with
similar technology budgets. For example, Latham & Watkins was able to
furnish GoSS representatives with satellite-powered communication
technology that enabled real-time communication with counsel. Another
example is legal translation services, which are highly specialized and
costly. During the representation of SPLM, Latham & Watkins' team
procured such services. In one instance, entire constitutional drafts were
translated on an expedited basis from Arabic to English and vice versa.
The expedited translation allowed the constitutional teams in the
contentious border states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile to draft and
negotiate in a language which did not disadvantage them, and also
emphasized the cultural right to have one's language represented in
governance. Yet another example is a privilege mega firm attorneys take
for granted: printing and shipping with little or no budgetary constraints.
about the Human Rights Council" and that "I have always stated that we need the United
Nations to be effective, we need it to be credible, we need it to be transparent." Fred
Frommer, Coleman Wants to Revoke U.S. Funding for U.N. Human Rights Council, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, (Jul. 26, 2007) available at http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/ web/ 2007/07/
26/colemanun/.
60. 1 have elsewhere elaborated on the robust social-psychological meaning of face-to-face
interactions and inter-personal authority relations and their impact on the social construction
of the authority of international legal institutions and on the social-psychological meaning of
citizenship in the emerging international polity. See, generally, Maya Steinitz, The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as Theater: The Social Negotiation of the Moral Authority of
International Law, 5 U. PENN J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (2007); Maya Steinitz, 'The Milosovic Trial -
Live!': An [conical Analysis of International Law's Claim of Legitimate Authority, 3 OXFORD J. INT'L
GRIM. JUsT. 103 (2005); Maya Steinitz, The Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals and a
Jurisprudence of the Deviant, 7 INT'L L. F. Du DROIT INTr'L 119 (2005).
61. See, e.g., ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2008), available at
http://www.abanet.org/vpr/mrpc/model-rules.html (which serves as the model for the
ethics and rules of most U.S. states).
62. Remarks at the Second Conference on International Investment at Columbia
University (Oct. 30, 2007) (transcript forthcoming 2008).
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As part of the standard deliverable work product, the legal team mailed
the client numerous binders - one for each negotiating delegate,
containing extensive research and reference material along with
constitutional language. Latham & Watkins had the binders delivered by
Federal Express from its European offices to the SPLM's office in Rumbek
(the then-capital of Southern Sudan), where international courier services
had only been made available, for the first time ever, in the preceding
month. In a manner wholly unexpected by the attorneys, several members
of the constitutional team were visibly excited to receive the printed
material. They indicated that the binders, in addition to serving the
constitutional process, would seed a law library and become part of the
GoSS' permanent collection of reference material, thus contributing on an
ongoing basis to the legal development of Southern Sudan.
A more interesting resource that mega law firms bring to the table is
human resources: the quality, subject-matter expertise, and diversity of
backgrounds of their attorneys. Mega law firms have a global presence
and employ attorneys from a variety of socio-legal cultures specializing in
a variety of fields including, importantly, expertise in areas that the public
sector lawyers rarely possess, such as finance, banking, and investment
law. 63 As a result, Latham & Watkins' diverse team of attorneys tailor
nuanced and complex legal arrangements, such as structuring a dual
banking system in which the north operates a Muslim, shari'a-based finance
system and the South a Western-based finance system; creating a Future
Generations Fund (trust funds to preserve gains from natural resources for
future generations); and designing a complex revenue-sharing mechanism
for oil profits. That diversity also allowed land use and environment
specialists on the legal team to work with one of the most prominent Africa
land-use experts to develop highly-detailed and refined proposals relating
to land law which, although not adopted in the constitutions for political
reasons, were universally acclaimed by members of the Southern Sudanese
delegation. The language allowed delegates, for the first time, to envision a
non-military solution to the war-inducing land-related challenges of the
Sudan.64
Moreover, the intimate familiarity of attorneys practicing at mega-
firms with the inner workings, perspectives and business methods of
63. For example, Latham & Watkins had attorneys who previously served as
constitutional and international law professors as well as human rights lawyers. The global
presence of the mega firms, the diverse personal and professional backgrounds of their
attorneys, and their subject-matter expertise can be gleaned from their website. See, e.g.,
Clifford Chance, About Us, http://www.cliffordchance.com/aboutus/about-the-firm/ (last
visited Mar. 2, 2009) ("The firm has unrivalled scale and depth of legal resources across the
three key markets of the Americas, Asia and Europe and focuses on the core areas of
commercial activity: capital markets; corporate and M&A; finance and banking .... Clifford
Chance has 30 offices in 21 countries and 3,800 legal advisers.").
64. 1 would like to give a special acknowledgement to Lou Leonard for his work on land
and environment issues as well as his pivotal role in the representation of SPLM. I would also
like to acknowledge the contribution of Dr. Liz Weily who transcended institutional politics
and lent her one-of-a-kind expertise to the representation of SPLM.
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multinational corporations is invaluable, because multinational
corporations are among the most influential players encountered by pro
bono clients in the developing world.65 The training afforded to attorneys
who represent oil companies in dealings with governments, for example,
allowed for a pragmatic and effective approach to the design of the CPA-
mandated petroleum commission. Such attorneys understand the
interests, concerns, strategies and tactics of oil companies, and how they
tend to view government officials in the developing world. The attorneys
were able to advise clients on the substance of the law, as well as on
negotiation strategies and tactics, based on this understanding.
Mega firms also bring to the table human resources in the narrower
sense of sheer legal manpower and, notoriously, an institutional culture in
which consecutive long-hour workdays are the norm. Usually, the benefit
of almost-unlimited legal manpower is a luxury reserved for time-sensitive
corporate work, but this "luxury," which can change the dynamic of any
negotiation, is provided to pro bono clients as well.66 In the course of the
representation of the SPLM, Latham & Watkins was able to provide
"emergency" legal services: when an urgent need for a complex, nuanced
and multi-disciplinary work product was created unexpectedly due to
political circumstance, a mega law firm was the only international player
with the necessary resources and infrastructure. For example, Latham &
Watkins was able to complete comments on a draft of a key contested
document within forty-eight hours by recruiting the entire team
representing SPLM - comprising fifty attorneys working in twelve
jurisdictions around the world - thus leveraging the different time-zones
of their respective jurisdictions. There is no other international player with
the kind of institutional norms, coupled with vast human resources, that
would enable it to provide the level of legal services necessary to level the
playing field in post-conflict contexts.
B. Impediments
What, then, are the potential downsides of providing international
legal aid through the attorney-client model? First, it should be
acknowledged that the general critiques that apply to international aid
generally apply to this form of international aid as well. The list of
grievances launched against the international aid sector includes critiques
65. See, eg., South Sudan Villagers, Environment Suffer from Oil Boom, SUDAN TRIB. (Mar. 2,
2009) available at http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26231 (reporting about the
arrival of oil companies to Southern Sudan):
Activists also warn that the 2006 arrival of White Nile Petroleum Company
(WNPOC), a consortium led by Malaysia's Petronas, in Unity State threatens the
Sudd wetlands, the world's largest maze of swamps, lagoons and tributaries.
Villagers say thousands were forcefully evicted to make way for a low-sulphur
crude oil venture in south-central Sudan. They say they lost venerated ancestral
homes, died from contamination and saw livelihoods jeopardized.
66. See supra notes 26-27.
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from cultural relativism, legitimacy deficit, and neo- and legal imperialism
to name but a few.67
One unique downside to the involvement of the private legal sector is
that of business conflicts and competing business interests. Unlike other
international aid players, law firms are for-profit businesses first and
foremost, and they may find themselves in business conflicts with certain
players they encounter in the pro bono context. This risk is exacerbated in
the case of mega law firms where, given the size of the firms, some lawyers
may have different interests than those guiding the specific lawyers who
take on a given pro bono representation. Business conflicts may lead to
limiting the scope of a representation, or even to withdrawing altogether. 68
They may also tempt the rogue attorney to fail to meet his obligation to his
pro bono client. Given that law firms are partnerships, not corporations,
and therefore that power within them is diffused horizontally as well as
vertically, internal politics can be harder to surmount than internal politics
in purely vertical NGOs and IGOs. 69 For example, one partner or practice
group may wish to prevent a certain representation suggested by another
partner or practice group because it is perceived as competing or otherwise
hurting the former's business model.
Another possible obstacle is that of professional myopia, which is the
flipside of the benefits of the special subject-matter expertise discussed
above, as well as the risk of the intimate familiarity with the multinational
corporations' mindset. Even with the best intentions, corporate lawyers
may be too invested in the corporate perspective to fully step outside of a
professional paradigm designed to serve corporate interests.
Private sector attorneys are also ethically constrained from "playing
67. For the most powerful overview of these critiques, based on thirty years of work in the
international aid "industry," see, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 2.
68. While ethical conflicts are regulated by ethics codes and rules of professional
responsibility, "business conflicts" relate to client-relationship sensitivities - usually,
situations in which a client or a category of clients may not wish to see their attorneys
represent other parties, even though there are no ethical conflicts involved. In such situations,
attorneys often refrain from taking on specific representations or categories of representations
in order to preserve existing or anticipated client relationships. A pertinent example could be
when an attorney or a firm represents, or wishes to represent in the future, certain
governments that may be in conflict with other governments who may benefit from a pro
bono representation. Another example would be an attorney or a firm that represents, or
wishes to represent, certain multi-national corporations which, in turn, anticipate negotiating
with actors in the developing world and therefore may not wish to see their lawyers provide
pro bono assistance to those developing world actors. Yet another example would be an
attorney or firm that wishes to provide certain services for a fee and would therefore not want
the same services provided pro bono so as not to set an expectation that such services can be
found without a fee. In order for a pro bono representation to be approved it has to pass a
firm's intake process, a process which looks, among other things, at both ethical and business
conflicts.
69. Law firms usually provide a legal statement regarding their form of incorporation on
their websites. See, e.g., Latham & Watkins, Legal Notices, available at http://www.lw.com/
AboutLatham.aspx?page=LegalNotices (last visited Mar. 2, 2009); Clifford Chance, Legal
Statement, available at, http:// www.cliffordchance.com/disclaimer/default.aspx?LanglD=
UK& (last visited Mar. 2, 2009); Shearman & Sterling, LLP Status,
http://www.shearman.com/disclaimer/llp/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
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ball" with some of the other international players by virtue of attorney-
client confidentiality. 70 For example, attorneys representing the GoSS
found that sharing information provided by the client while maintaining
the attorney-client privilege is only possible if certain relationships, such as
retaining the other player as an expert and requiring it to adhere to the
confidentiality requirements, are formed and formalized. However, these
modes of cooperation were designed for the litigation and transactional
contexts and do not work well in the international aid context, because
potential partners who are NGOs and IGOs may need or want to take
primary credit for joint projects to show outputs to their donors and to reap
the reputational gains. 71  Taking credit often requires divulging the
contents of communications, sharing drafts and final work products, and
openly discussing the nature of the work and of the relationship with the
stakeholder or client. None of these are appropriate, or in some cases
allowed, in the context of the attorney-client relationship. 72 Therefore,
since many players are either unfamiliar or uncomfortable with the kind of
relationships attorneys must form in order to cooperate and coordinate,
law firms can be alienated, and alienating, players.
Finally, a key concern, alluded to above, is that while the work of the
attorneys is domestically regulated, this regulation is largely theoretical
when practicing law across national-jurisdictional borders. When working
with clients in the developing world, it is highly unlikely that the client will
ever invoke the domestic regulatory mechanisms.
Thus, while the extent to which professional responsibility norms are
internalized and self-enforced by practitioners 73  can bring the
aforementioned benefits of the attorney-client relationship to global pro
bono representation, this regulation should not be left to loose mechanisms
such as socialization and internalization.
The unique benefits of the attorney-client relationship hinge on the
level to which professional responsibility norms have been internalized,
exacerbated by the fact that the attorney-client relationship is an unnatural
relationship. One does not naturally put aside all of one's value judgments
and moral outlook and advocate those of another. The context in which
professional responsibility skills are acquired and maintained is the context
in which socialization is coupled with formal regulation by bar
70. See supra note 54.
71. For a glimpse into the fundraising world, see The Foundation Center's website,
http://foundationcenter.org/getstarted/nonprofits/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2009). For an
example of an NGO's promotional materials (which, in turn, are usually abbreviated versions
of donor reports that are not publicly available) review the International Senior Lawyers 2007
Annual Report, available at http://islp.org/Annual%20Report/2007%2OAnnual%20Report-
%20Web%2OVersion.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
72. See supra note 54.
73. Such internalization is emphasized by the transnational legal scholar Harold Hongju
Koh when he writes that "[a]s transnational actors interact, they create patterns of behavior
and generate norms of external conduct which they in turn internalize." Transnational Legal
Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 204 (1996).
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associations. 74
Nor is it natural for such clients to believe - and risk much in so doing
- that a stranger will listen to them dispassionately, keep their
confidences, and advocate for them zealously and at their sole discretion.
Without such a belief and willingness to act on behalf of the "client," a law
firm becomes just another international assistance provider swept up in an
endless dance wherein the local recipients try to divine the firm's objectives
and determine how to squeeze from those objectives some measure of local
benefit. So long as the relationship is on these terms, and the "client" will
not share even a modicum of its confidential thinking, none of the "local
ownership" benefits of the attorney-client relationship will inhere.
One evident solution to lawyers who may be adrift without formal Bar
oversight, and to "clients" who may not understand themselves as such, is
non-domestic regulation of the practice of law. However, as the growing
body of literature regarding the general topic of cross-border lawyering
suggests, non-domestic regulation of lawyering must overcome a two-
pronged objection: for one, that such regulation cannot be achieved; for
another, that it should not be achieved. 75 Specifically, the first prong refers
to the fact that international governance is not simply domestic governance
intensified; rather, it is different in important ways, as discussed at length
below. The second prong stems from the general critique that it is
undesirable to harmonize legal systems, including ethical codes, across
borders; rather, diversity of legal and regulatory regimes should be
preserved to reflect the diversity of the cultures in which they operate.
One is therefore confronted with the question posed at the outset of this
Note: how do we maximize the unique benefits conferred by the attorney-
client relationship while minimizing its downsides?
IV. TOWARDS A GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF PRO BONO REGULATION
The above-mentioned dual challenge is not unique to the regulation of
pro bono services in the rule of law development context, or even to the
regulation of lawyering more generally. Rather, it is a subset of the more
general challenges to the design of global governance. The "globalization
paradox" - needing more government yet fearing it - has been described
as resulting from the fact that:
74. See supra note 54.
75. See Mark S. Ellis, Developing a Global Program for Enhancing Accountability: Key Ethical
Tenets for the Legal Profession in the 211 Century, 54 S.C. L. REV. 1011, 1026 (2003) (calling for the
development of a global program for enhancing accountability through an internationally
accepted code of ethics); John M. Townsend, Clash and Convergence on Ethical Issues in
International Arbitration, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (2005) (discussing the effect of a
cohesive ethics-regulatory gap as it relates to the practice of international arbitration); Whelan,
supra note 45, at 936 (discussing the accelerated trend toward universal standards of
professional responsibility as a result of the globalization of law practice in the 1990s,
surveying regulatory initiatives and literature on the trend, and discussing the critique of
professional codes as an exclusionary practice and as privatized legislation).
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[a] world government is both infeasible and undesirable. The size
and scope of such a government presents an unavoidable and
dangerous threat to individual liberty. Further, the diversity of the
peoples to be governed make it almost impossible to conceive of a
global demos. No form of democracy within the current global
repertoire seems capable of overcoming these obstacles .... We
need more government on a global... scale, but we don't want the
centralization of decision-making power and coercive authority so
far from the people actually to be governed. 76
This Note argues that the new theoretical paradigm of Global
Administrative Law, a branch of global governance studies, can provide a
framework for any future efforts to foster regulation of international pro
bono representations.
A. What is Global Administrative Law?
GAL is a new theoretical framework put forth by a group of scholars
who examine the empirical, de facto emergence of transnational
administrative law. 77 GAL scholarship is both descriptive - creating a
76. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 8 (2004). Slaughter further states,
"Addressing the paradox at the global level is further complicated by the additional concern
of accountability. In the 1990s the conventional reaction to the problem of 'world
government' was instead to champion 'global governance,' a much looser and less threatening
concept of collective organization and regulation without coercion." Id. at 9. In response to
critics of these spontaneous transgovernmental networks that arise outside of the framework
of international organizations and executive agreements, Slaughter suggests a number of
measures that would address accountability, such as a virtual network represented by a well-
serviced website, global "information agencies," global "legislative networks" that would not
only share information but also coordinate on the passage of "parallel domestic legislation,"
and the folding of transgovernmental networks into "mixed networks of governmental and
private actors." Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information
Agencies and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041, 1056-57 (2003). Anne-Marie
Slaughter is a leading scholar in the liberal tradition of international relations, a strand of
thought that ascribes to the notion that, in the realm of international politics, individuals and
private groups are the fundamental actors whose interests are represented in the state. See
Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87
AM. J. INTL. L. 205, 227-28 (1993). By contrast, the competing international relations realist
tradition advances the view that the state is the primary actor in the international political
realm; a realm which, realists argue, can only be understood in terms of differences in power
between states. As a result, realists treat international rules and international institutions as
mere epiphenomena, or reflection of existing power relations between states, rather than
independent determinants of state behavior. See Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations
Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 92 AM. J. INT'L
L. 361, 364-65 (1999).
77. See generally, Global Administrative Law Project, About the Project,
http://www.iilj.org/global-adlaw/index.htm (last visited May 3, 2009) [hereinafter GAL
Homepage] (describing GAL generally and the Global Administrative Law Project
specifically). For additional background on the issues, see J.M. Migai Akech, Development
Partners and Governance of Public Procurement in Kenya: Enhancing Democracy in the
Administration of Aid, 37 NYU J. INT'L L. & POL. 829 (2005) (discussing governance problems in
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taxonomy of the kind of regulatory mechanisms that are, in fact, emerging
in various areas of global social life - and normative, examining the value-
laden aspects of global regulation. The GAL enterprise can be described as
an exercise in creating a reflective equilibrium between the "is" and the
"ought" in the field of global regulation. Scholars shuttle back and forth
between the emerging patterns and institutions of global administration
and the normative goals of administrative law. Their ultimate goal is to
"identify, design, and help build transnational and global structures to
fulfill functions at least somewhat comparable to those administrative law
fulfills domestically, and to reform domestic administrative law to enable it
to deal with the increasingly global character of regulation." 78 In the
process, GAL scholars seek to allow a "critical distance on general - and
often overly broad - claims about democratic deficits in these
institutions."79
When calling attention to the fact of emerging patterns of global
administrative law, the term "global" is used both to distinguish this body
of law from classic international law and to reflect the "enmeshment of
domestic and international regulation." 80  This terminological choice,
which invokes the more established term "global governance," also
invokes the notion that the law in question - administrative law on the
global plane - is not simply national administrative law intensified:
Domestic law presumes a shared sense of what constitutes
administrative action, even though it may be defined primarily in
existing development assistance programs from the viewpoint of GAL); Benedict Kingsbury et
al., Foreword: Global Governance as Administration - National and Transnational Approaches to
Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., I (Summer/Autumn 2005) (articulating
the legal theory and practice of GAL); Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global
Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT'L LAW 1
(2006) (describing the possibilities and problems of GAL in the context of global governance).
The description of GAL herein derives largely from the seminal GAL manifesto, Benedict
Kingsbury, et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law (Institute for International Law
and Justice, Working Paper No. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Emergence of GAL]. GAL is an example of
transnational law, which Harold Hongju Koh describes as either "law that is 'downloaded'
from international to domestic law ... law that is 'uploaded' [from a domestic legal system to
international law], then downloaded .. . into nearly every [domestic] legal system in the
world... or law that is borrowed or 'horizontally transplanted' from one national system to
another." Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 745,
745-76 (2006). Transnational law was defined in the 1950s by Phillip Jessup to embrace all
"'law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers' and including '[bloth
public and private international law .. [plus] other rules which do not wholly fit into such
standard categories,' and was adapted by legal scholars in the 1980s in lieu of the traditional
public/private, domestic/international categories." Harold Hongju Koh, ihy Do Nations
Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2626 (1997) (quoting PHILIP JESSUP,
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956)).
78. See Emergence of GAL, supra note 77, at 28.
79. Id. at 14-15.
80. Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global
Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT'L LAW 1 at 1, 5 (2006)
(reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) and THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1997)).
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the negative - as state acts that are not legislative or judicial -
and even though the boundaries between these categories are
blurred at the margins. Beyond the domain of the state, no such
agreed functional differentiation prevails; the institutional
landscape is much more variegated than in domestic settings.81
Given the unique attributes of the international global order, there is
no way to transplant domestic administrative systems to the global level.8 2
Global governance is different in kind. Its unique attributes include the
absence of a central government, a lack of conventional enforcement
mechanisms replaced by compliance incentives, 3 a "general dearth ... of
checks and balances," 84 the non-delegated nature of the power of the most
important actors,8 5 and the lack of a defined global public.8 6 These result in
an accountability deficit supported by a fiction of "stretched" elective
control and by reference to unclear constituencies on behalf of whom the
regulators claim to regulate.
Closely related to the accountability deficit, and stemming from the
same underlying characteristics, is a legitimacy deficit most often invoked
in connection with the reluctance of powerful states to agree to
mechanisms of global administrative law unless they see those
mechanisms as furthering their own interests. 8 7 The legitimacy deficit is
also fueled by the lack of participation, transparency, review, and rule-
governed mechanisms, as well as by the unidentifiable or controversial
sources of authority of the regulatory activity. These factors are all
mentioned in the context of global governance generally and GAL
specifically, and some have argued that they lead not merely to a
legitimacy deficit but indeed to a legality problem.88
The two-pronged objection to the notion of regulating global pro bono
legal services, namely that they either cannot be regulated or should not be
regulated, is actually a subset of the challenges which lie at the very heart
of global administrative law.
81. Emergence of GAL, supra note 77, at 17.
82. See Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality and the Transplant Effect, 47
EUR. ECON. REV. 165 (2003) (discussing the challenges and determinates of effective
"transplantation" of legal arrangements more generally).
83. See infra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
84. See Emergence of GAL, supra note 77, at 44 (citing Ruth Grant & Robert Keohane,
Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics (Inst. for Int'l Law and Justice,
Working Paper No. 7, 2004)).
85. GAL is an example of transnational legal process at work. Harold Hongju Koh, a
leading scholar of transnational liberalism, notes that the "key agents in [the] transnational
legal process are transnational norm entrepreneurs, governmental norm sponsors,
transnational issue networks, interpretive communities and law-declaring fora, bureaucratic
compliance procedures, and issue linkages among issue areas." Harold Hongju Koh, How Is
International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1409 (1999).
86. See Emergence of GAL, supra note 77, at 44.
87. Eyal Benvenisti, The Interplay Between Actors as a Determinant of the Evolution of
Administrative Law in International Institutions, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 319,323-4 (2005).
88. See Emergence of GAL, supra note 77, at 16.
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GAL scholars argue that these shortfalls are ameliorated, however, by a
"global administrative space" populated by several distinct types of
regulatory administrative institutions. These institutions offer several
identifiable types of administration:8 9  administration by formal
international organizations; administration based on collective action by
transnational networks of governmental officials; distributed
administration conducted by national regulators under treaty regimes,
mutual recognition arrangements or cooperative standards; administration
by hybrid intergovernmental-private arrangements; and administration by
private institutions with regulatory functions.90
Instead of command-and-control administration and a structure of
delegation, which form the core of domestic administrative law, GAL
scholars suggest that "anomalous forms of domestic administrative law -
informality, networks, and cooperative structures - dominate the global
level." 91  Characteristic of all the emerging patterns and types is a
multilayered structure with no identifiable center and no delegation
structures. The absence of a central decision-making structure and the
resulting multi-layered nature of diffused decision-making (which makes
the attribution of responsibility for decisions difficult to establish) result in
the dominance of informal cooperation among domestic regulators.
In light of the above, the normative mission of the GAL paradigm is to
address and suggest ways to increase "accountability, transparency,
participation, and review of exercises of power in global regulation and
governance [by] integrat[ing] international law, administrative law, and
other disciplines." 92  By suggesting the application of solutions
contemplated by the GAL scholarship to the provision of global pro bono
legal services, this Note seeks to do the same with respect to global pro
bono legal services. When applying these principles to global pro bono
legal services one needs to keep in mind, however, the unique attributes of
lawyering and the way in which lawyering, including the provision of pro
bono services, is regulated.
B. The Current Situation: Accidental Distributive Administration of
Global Pro Bono Legal Services
In addition to the general challenges to global administrative law, and
unlike in some of the other contexts in which global regulation emerges,
there is no legal vacuum per se relating to the regulation of cross-border
practice of law, pro bono or otherwise. Rather, attorneys in all jurisdictions
are currently regulated by their local Bars and are thus subject to domestic
regulation. More specifically and importantly, attorneys are subject to self-
89. Id. at 18.
90. Id. at 8.
91. Id. at42.
92. See GAL Homepage, supra note 77 (emphasis added).
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regulation, a fact that heightens some of the general problems of GAL
discussed above.
Carried over to the global administrative space, the domestic self-
regulation amounts to accidental regulation - regulation which emerges
through patterns of interaction rather than through a deliberate process.
More specifically, it amounts to extra-jurisdictional, ineffectual regulation
which hyper-extends the fiction of elective control and accountability.
While this form of regulation was never intended to apply to a
transnational practice of law, and certainly not to provide recourse for
unsophisticated, non-domestic pro bono clients who may wish to challenge
the quality of the services provided to them, in practice it now amounts to
what one might call "global distributive administration," whereby
"domestic regulatory agencies [i.e., domestic Bar associations] act as part of
the global administrative space: they take decisions on issues of concern to
other jurisdictions or globally." 93 The (originally unforeseen) consequence
is the exercise of (indirect) extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction, in which
self-regulatory organizations in one state seek to regulate activity primarily
occurring elsewhere. 94
When private actors assume regulatory functions in domestic contexts
they usually do so under structures of delegation from public bodies (both
administrative and legislative) that possess relatively effective means to
control or correct private governance. The same is not true, however, of
the transnational sphere. Thus, while the American legal profession
operates under the model of a self-regulating guild, this guild derives its
authority, and the ultimate legal source of its operation, from
Congressional legislation. This link to an ultimate source of authority and
legitimacy cannot be said to exist when, for example, the New York State
Bar regulates the activities of a New York lawyer in Kenya. Nor can such a
link exist on the international level because "such a public order is largely
lacking, and yet, private bodies perform far-reaching tasks, often spurred
by the absence of effective public regulation. In these circumstances, it is
unclear how accountability for private governance can be organized."95
C. A Solution: From Accidental Distributed Administration to
Deliberate Transnational Network Administration
A particularly helpful concept employed by GAL scholars is the
concept of networks. A network, in the context of global governance, is "a
93. See Emergence of GAL, supra note 77, at 9. As this definition makes explicit, the term
"distributive administration" does not refer to some centralized or organized administration.
Rather, it refers to the fact that increasingly, domestic regulatory agencies have the effect,
whether deliberate or inadvertent, of regulating beyond their jurisdictions.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 43. The IBA stands in contrast to "global private governance organizations, such
as ISO and international sports federations, [which] have adopted certain procedures of
accountability and review in order to enhance their effectiveness and legitimacy." Id.
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pattern of regular and purposive relations among like government units
working across the borders that divide countries from one another and that
demarcate the 'domestic' from the 'international' sphere." 96 A major
element of global governance and the globalization paradox has been "the
rise of global policy networks celebrated for their ability to bring together
all public and private actors on issues critical to the global public
interest." 97 Governance networks contribute to world order by creating
convergence and informed divergence, improving compliance with
international rules, and increasing the scope, nature, and quality of
international cooperation. Regulation by networks happens when such
networks issue codes of conduct, provide training and technical assistance,
regulate by information, and impose social costs for non-compliance.
Regulatory networks can thus at times amount to enforcement networks
replacing the traditional command-and-control governance familiar from
the domestic context. 98  Networks are flexible, informal, and non-
hierarchical. They confer prestige upon those who participate in them and
they place costs on non-participation. In short, networks are discursive.
Given the discursive (participatory) nature of global policy and
regulatory networks and given that governance networks "have domestic
roots and directly engage the participation and the credibility of the
individuals who must ultimately be responsible for addressing [the
regulatory issues at hand]," 99 governance networks also mitigate the
accountability and legitimacy deficits. Their role, thus described, renders
them more effective than one might initially imagine.
Empirical GAL studies show that administrative law on the global
scale does indeed happen, inter alia, through networks.10 0 Specifically,
networks create soft law and that soft law is enforced by soft power.
Originally coined by Lord McNair to describe vague norms of international
law, 101 the term "soft law" has come to mean non-treaty obligations or the
96. SLAUGHTER, supra note 76, at 14. To further contextualize the phenomenon and
concept of global governance through networks, it should be noted that these networks are
viewed as the primary cause and effect of the newly disaggregated state. In a nutshell, "[tihe
state is not disappearing, but it is disaggregating into its component institutions which are
increasingly interacting principally with their foreign counterparts across borders." Id. at 18;
see also id. at 12 "The desegregation of the state is a phenomenon. Government networks are a
technology of governance that are probably both cause and effect of this phenomenon." Id. at
31.
97. Id. at 9. Slaughter offers a comprehensive taxonomy of networks and their attributes.
These include, among others, horizontal networks and vertical networks which, in turn, can
and do serve as information networks, enforcement networks, and harmonization networks.
Examples abound, including the regulatory networks of central bankers, financial regulators
and utilities commissioners, id. at 12-14, where Slaughter dubs the interfacing regulators "the
new diplomats." While Slaughter does not go much beyond government officials, as captured
by the term "the disaggregated state," GAL's taxonomy, and with it this Note, extend the
conceptual framework to include domestically self-regulated industries which serve functions
similar to those of governmental regulation.
98. Id. at 24-25.
99. Id. at 25.
100. Id. at 36.
101. Jean d'Aspremont, Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New Legal
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array of non-binding instruments under which parties choose to
nonetheless assume obligations.102 Classic examples of soft law include the
body of governing standards created by the United Nations General
Assembly through Resolutions and Declarations. In the context of
corporate responsibility, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the outputs of
voluntary initiatives such as the Global Compact are viewed as soft law.103
Soft power, a term developed by international relations scholar Joseph
Nye, describes the ability to indirectly influence the behavior or interests of
others through persuasion and through cultural, sociological, and
psychological means. It is "the power of information, socialization,
persuasion and discussion." 04 Regarding the soft power of nations, Nye
writes:
Everyone is familiar with hard power. We know that military and
economic might often get others to change their position. Hard
power can rest on inducements ("carrots") or threats ("sticks").
But sometimes you can get the outcomes you want without
tangible threats or payoffs . . . . A country may obtain the
outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries -
admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of
prosperity and openness - want to follow it .... This soft power
Materials, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1075, 1081 (2008).
102. See ALISTAIR RIEU-CLARKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 11
n.6 (2005) (citing A. D. McNAIR, THE LAW OF NATIONS (1961)); see also Hartmut Hillgenberg, A
Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 499 (1999) (discussing the regime of international non-
treaty obligations with which parties choose to bind themselves and which excludes the
application of treaty or customary law); John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The
Evolving International Agenda, AM. J. INT'L L. at 16, 21-23; Kennedy Sch. Of Gov't, Harv. Univ.
Corp. Soc. Resp. Initiative, Working Paper No. 31 (discussing the role of soft law in regulating
multinational enterprises (i.e., corporate responsibility) which, as discussed above, should be
seen as coextensive with the activities of mega law firms). John Gerard Ruggie (who also
serves as the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative for Business and
Human Rights) is a leading scholar of constructivism, which rejects the notion implied by
other international relations theories that states or other international actors have interests
that can be objectively determined. Instead, constructivists believe that international actors
operate in a context of socially constructed understandings and norms, which in turn
determine the behavior of states and other international actors. Kenneth W. Abbott,
International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal
Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361, 367-68 (1999). In addition, under Ruggie's leadership as the
Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, transnational networks are already at
work in the creation of soft law, as evidenced by the convening of academic experts, legal
practitioners, and NGOs during a series of workshops and working papers around issues of
transnational corporate responsibility for human rights and under international law. See
generally Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Implementation of
General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled "Human Rights Council,"
Addendum 2, Corporate Responsibility Under International Law and Issues in Extraterritorial
Regulation: Summary of Legal Workshops, A/HRC/4/35/Add.2 (Feb. 15, 2007), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/GO7/108/45/ PDF/G0710845.pdf?OpenElem
ent (last visited Dec. 2, 2008).
103. See Ruggie, supra note 102, at 21.
104. SLAUGHTER, supra note 76, at 27.
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- getting others to want the outcomes that you want - co-opts
people rather than coerces them . . . Soft power uses a different
type of currency (not force, not money) to engender cooperation -
an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of
contributing to the achievement of those values.105
The unique benefits that can be derived through the provision of global
pro bono services, at the heart of which is local ownership, can be
enhanced - and its potential downfalls avoided or at least minimized -
through a move from accidental and distributive administration to
deliberate and deliberative regulation though transnational legal regulatory
networks.106
This can be achieved by using existing networks or creating new ones
to consciously act as policy/regulatory networks in order to foster discourse
and consensus on how pro bono services should be rendered, issue soft law
(e.g., guidelines and best practices), monitor non-compliance, and make
information on the same publicly available:
[N]etworks could be empowered to provide much more technical
assistance of the kind needed to build governance capacity in
many countries around the world. They could be tasked with
everything from developing codes of conduct to tackling specific
policy problems. They could be designated interlocutors for the
multitudes of nongovernmental actors, who must be engaged in
global governance as they are in domestic governance.10 7
105. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS 5-7 (2004)
(helpfully noting that "liln international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise
in large part from the values an organization .. expresses in its culture, in the examples it
sets by its internal practices and policies, and in the way it handles its relation to others").
Joseph Nye is a leading scholar of the international relations theory known as institutionalism,
which agrees with realism that states are the fundamental actors in international politics, but
diverges from it on the importance of international institutions. Anne-Marie Slaughter,
International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 218,
221-22 (1993). In contrast to realists, institutionalists believe that international institutions --
which include formal organizations, codified rules and norms, and established or customary
rules, norms and conventions - are as fundamental to state behavior as state power. Id.
106. In his explanation of soft power's displacement of hard power and other traditionally
recognized forms of power, Nye warns that the use of soft power by transnational actors is
not necessarily harmonious. According to Nye,
interdependence does not mean harmony. Rather, it means unevenly
balanced mutual dependence . . . . Further, interdependence is often
balanced differently in different spheres .... Thus, creating and resisting
linkages between issues ... becomes the art of the power game. Political
leaders use international institutions to discourage or promote such
linkages; they shop for the forum that defines the scope of an issue in the
manner best suiting their interests.
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power, FOREIGN POLICY, 1990, at 153, 158, available at
http:/ / www.foreignpolicy.com/ Ning/archive/archive/080/SOFTrPOWER.PDF.
107. SLAUGHTER, supra note 76, at 26.
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Such transnational administrative legal networks should embark on a
mission to systematically exchange information, coordinate policy,
cooperate on enforcement issues, collect and distill "best practices," bolster
their members in domestic networks, and transmit information about their
members' reputation as those relate to the members' global pro bono
activities. 08 Closely related, the transnational administrative legal network
suggested will serve as an "epistemic community" to its members - a
community of "professionals with recognized expertise and competence in
a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant
knowledge within that domain or issue-area." 109
Such deliberate self-regulation on the global plane will: (1) enhance
domestic accountability; (2) enforce reasoned decision-making, (3) create a
mechanism for review by national authorities using substantive standards
(e.g., of proportionality, means-ends rationality, avoidance of unnecessarily
restrictive means, legitimate expectations); and (4) increase procedural
participation. Procedural participation is perhaps the most important of
these effects; participants might include representatives of local Bars,
NGOs, businesses and other civil society actors." 0
An infrastructure of transnational legal networks already exists in the
form of the International Bar Association, the International Law
Association and the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of Europe
(CCBE). There are also regional fora that have gained prominence as
centers of deliberation on international law generally, such as the American
Society of International Law and the European Society of International
Law. While to some degree culturally non-neutral, they are nonetheless
quite inclusive of non-Americans and non-Europeans respectively and
already provide flexible, informal, and non-hierarchical fora in which soft
law can be produced and disseminated. If these fora were to add to their
agenda the regulation of attorneys who provide pro bono legal services,
then they could help achieve the goals of maximizing the benefits of these
kinds of international aid interventions and of minimizing the downsides.
In this vein, the following paragraphs offer a blueprint for action"'
108. Id. at 40. "Equally important is the information that participants in a network
exchange about each other - concerning competence, quality, integrity, and
professionalism." Id. at 54.
109. Peter Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46
INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992).
110. See Emergence of GAL, supra note 77, at 24-26. Kingsbury et al. recognize that we are in
the realm of non-ideal theory; under current circumstances, no satisfactory democratic basis for
global administration is available, but global administrative structures are nevertheless
required to deal with problems national democracies are unable to solve on their own. In this
non-ideal situation, global administrative law might take pragmatic steps towards a stronger
inclusion of affected social and economic interests through mechanisms of participation and
review open to NGOs, business firms, and other civil society actors, as well as states and
international organizations. See id. at 36-37.
111. These suggestions derive some inspiration from the Beijing Conference on Women.
Officially titled The Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development and
Peace, the Beijing Conference is held under the auspices of the United Nations and convenes
every five years to frame a discourse and foster connections and interactions. The 1995 Beijing
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including three essential measures and a list of possible activities to be
undertaken. This list is meant to spark a debate rather than be taken as a
prescription.
In order to successfully systematize large-scale international pro
bono work - which would match the vast untapped resources of attorneys
in the developed world with the great need for rule of law development
and other legal assistance in the developing world - and to allow for a
regulatory function, the deliberate transnational administrative network
should have the following basic features:
* A high-visibility platform. The initiative should be tied to an
existing, high-visibility host organization which can provide
essentials (such as loaned staff, office space, seed funding
for the start-up phase,1 2 telecommunications technology,
and a website) and draw on its existing connections to
ensure the robust participation of key global players.
* Inclusion of the potential developing world counterparts. It is
imperative that potential pro bono clients in developing
countries and local players who can reach out to potential
clients be strongly represented. This includes staff attorneys
at local NGOs, representatives of ministries of justice, public
sector attorneys, members of parliament, and possibly
members of the private bar associations. Given the capacity
gap and the tendency of participants from the developed
world to dominate international fora (usually inadvertently)
it is recommended that participants from the host countries
be represented in numbers greater than their proportion to
ensure their voices are heard. A non-exhaustive list of
additional participants might include pro bono counsel of
firms wishing to engage in international pro bono,
representatives of intermediary nonprofits (see below), and
Conference brought together delegates from 189 governments, more than 30,000 women and
me and representatives from 2,600 NGOs. United Nations, Division for the Advancement of
Women, Department of Social and Economic Affairs, Background,
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/background.htm. It resulted in the
Beijing Declaration which, given the wide participation in its drafting, has a strong "soft
power" pull. It also resulted in a Platform for Action, a global, agreed-upon agenda for
change used as a touchstone by activists the world over. . See FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE
ON WOMEN, BEIJING 1995, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/ (last
visited Dec. 8, 2008).
Among other benefits, the suggested blueprint aims to grant greater access to pro bono
services to a wider range of potential clients. Currently these services are distributed
somewhat haphazardly, depending on the interests and access of the individual attorneys and
firms interested in providing their services to indigents clients overseas. Similarly, it will
allow attorneys from firms other than mega-firms to gain access to clients and offer their
services, including the option of partnering with like-minded attorneys in other firms or solo
practices.
112. Mega firms often make monetary contributions to intermediary nonprofits or
"clearinghouses," with which they partner for pro bono work. It can therefore be anticipated
that some funding can come from this source.
236 [Vol. 12
32
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 12 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol12/iss1/5
2009] Internationalized Pro Bono and a New Global Role for Lawyers 237
representatives of bar associations in the developed world.
Foster the creation, sustainability and inclusion of field-based, in-
country intermediaries. As alluded to earlier, without the
assistance of Rule of Law International, an in-country NGO
which had the relationship with and trust of the SPLM,
Latham & Watkins' representation of SPLM could not have
occurred. Given the face-to-face nature of relationships in
many post-conflict and developing countries, and the need
for on-the-ground presence to acquire the in-depth cultural
insight necessary for effective representations, it is unlikely
that this form of assistance will flourish without a cadre of
in-country intermediary NGOs setting up shop in the most
difficult corners of the world." 3  The existence of such
organizations must be deliberately fostered in order to be
able to better identify, screen and serve indigent clients in
the developing world.
Once a network is thus established, it is advisable that it undertake
the following activities (though, of course, there could be others):
* Conduct regular meetings. The network should hold plenary
meetings bringing all stakeholders together periodically, as
well as country- or region-specific meetings. A network
should also hold thematic conferences relating to specific
subject matters (e.g., international criminal law, rule of law
development, disability rights in the developing world, etc.)
and focus on pragmatic and programmatic tools-of-the-
trade.114
* Establish and maintain permanent committees. Small
committees should be established with permanent staff -
including both staff members with legal education and staff
members with development work expertise - devoted to a
continuous effort to coordinate pro bono work. For
example, the network could establish a finance committee
charged with fund-raising and outreach (see below).
Another possibility would be to create a monitoring
committee that makes periodic reports on global, regional,
113. Latham & Watkins' representation of SPLM required deep knowledge of the local
culture and local circumstances; close relationships with the local players (longstanding
relationships with the relevant ministers and judges of the GoSS, for example); and frequent
meetings to discuss client needs, disseminate lawyers' work product, and explain the work
product to the client if necessary. As discussed, clients often have no access to modern
technology (email, fax or even phone) and often there is a vast capacity gap between the
attorneys and their clients. Since the firms and attorneys offering their pro bono services
cannot travel frequently or for lengthy time periods, if at all, it is crucial to have an
intermediary in the form of an in-country NGO or a branch of an IGO, preferably one with
staff lawyers.
114. Where possible, conferences should award continuing legal education credits.
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or country-specific issues and whose members travel for on-
site fact-finding missions as well as receive reports from
host countries and law firms.
* Promulgate best practices. An effective network should
establish guidelines and best practices by which participants
in the network should hold themselves accountable.
* Take disciplinary action and issue ethics opinions.15  A
committee should be established to fulfill a core regulatory
function by vetting and hearing clients' complaints. The
committee can be an elected one to ensure accountability
and representativeness for this sensitive function. In all
likelihood, sanctions would be symbolic (issuing opinions
and denying membership in the network), thus levying
reputational costs as an enforcement mechanism. The
committee may also mediate disputes between clients and
their attorneys. A committee can also issue interpretations
and answer anonymous questions regarding ethical issues
that arise.11 6
* Create and maintain a website. A website can facilitate online
interaction and information sharing. 117
" Provide resources and publications. The network should
encourage the creation and dissemination of relevant
professional literature, including disciplinary and ethics
opinions, and providing a listing potential pro bono service
providers so that prospective clients can choose among
different firms.
* Create and maintain referral services, mailing lists, directories and
newsletters: These are all online and offline tools that can
help bridge the gap between those in need of pro bono
services and those seeking to offer their services.
* Fund and administer scholarships and outreach programs.
Funding for outreach activities and sponsorship of
participation of representatives from the developing world
in the activities of the network is imperative to increase
participation and legitimacy. The network can also reach
115. No doubt, this will be the most controversial suggestion in this paper. Most
practitioners who have commented on drafts of this Note opined that any form of sanctions
and, indeed, many went so far as saying any form of (self) regulation would stifle firms'
willingness to provide pro bono services, citing regulation as a high cost on a voluntary, not-
for-fee activity.
116. This is a common tool of self-regulatory organizations. Compare, for example, the
New York State Bar Association and the Security and Exchange Commission. See New York
State Bar Association, Ethics Opinions, available at http://www.nysba.org, then follow "Ethics
Opinions" hyperlink (last visited Mar. 2, 2009); U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
Staff Interpretations, http://sec.gov/interps.shtml (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
117. See, e.g., the International Bar Association's website, http://www.ibanet.org/
(providing a repository of publications and offering information about conferences,
scholarships and training opportunities).
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out to law schools, bar associations and clinics in both
service-providing jurisdictions and in the jurisdictions
where legal assistance is needed in order to both leverage
resources as well as build local capacity and transfer
knowledge in addition to taking on particular
representations.
CONCLUSION
The globalization of pro bono services is here to stay and is likely to
expand, given the current trajectory of globalization and the increasing
scope of corporate responsibility initiatives. This globalization offers great
potential, as exemplified by the emerging trend of pro bono international
aid by mega law firms in the context of rule of law development. The
inherent nature of the attorney-client relationship offers the unique benefits
of local ownership for aid recipients, a new authority relationship between
aid recipient as client and aid donor as servicer, and a body of self-
regulated practitioners. Mega law firms, in turn, are not only immune to
some of the shortcomings of traditional international aid donors, but also
provide the distinctive benefits of exceptional material and human
resources. Mega law firms also offer an intimate familiarity with multi-
national corporations, which is particularly useful when such corporations
transact with clients in post-conflict societies.
However, the internationalization of pro bono legal representations
may come at a cost. The intimate relationships that mega law firms
maintain with multi-national corporate interests may cause professional
myopia, as well as potential business conflicts and competing business
interests vis-A-vis a firm's pro bono representation of developing and post-
conflict societies. In addition, the unique attorney-client relationship
constrains the necessary relationship-building with other players in the
realm of international aid. Perhaps more worrisome is that the self-
regulation of international legal practitioners results from loose
mechanisms of socialization and internalization, and therefore its benefits
may be largely illusory when transposed to the international pro bono
context.
Luckily, such costs - in addition to any accountability or legitimacy
deficits caused by a global governance gap - can be minimized and any
benefits of pro bono legal representations maximized if the GAL
framework of networks and soft power is appropriately applied to the
globalized pro bono representation space; that is, if those offering their
services move away from accidental and distributive administration and
regulation, and instead accept - indeed, seek - the same level of
accountability they offer their commercial clients at home for their overseas
pro bono clients. As this Note has shown, the infrastructure already exists
in the form of international legal organizations that can serve as platforms
for deliberate and deliberative transnational network administration and
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can help to regulate this novel form of international aid on the global plane.
The theoretical framework within which to contemplate such a
deliberative, discursive process is also at hand and a blueprint is offered
herein upon which the international legal community and pro bono clients
can begin to realize the full potential of internationalized pro bono services
in the 21st century.
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